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Abstract
This contribution offers recommendations for strengthening the effectiveness of the OSCE
based on the results of the “Fit-for-Purpose” reform agenda, which the author conducted
during his term as Secretary General of the OSCE (2017–2020). While the OSCE is capable
of reform, there is a clear need for further political engagement. The author recommends
giving the Secretariat the space it needs to amend management processes and structures. Further
recommendations include streamlining the budget process, providing executive structures with
a timely budget and adequate resources, strengthening the Secretariat’s capacity for strategic
planning, encouraging coordination among executive structures, and updating the modalities of
their programmatic work.
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Introduction
The OSCE is operating in a challenging
political environment: trust in multilater-
al institutions and mechanisms for solv-
ing global problems is low, and unilateral
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and transactional approaches are prevail-
ing. The polarization of key state actors
in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian securi-
ty area is deepening, violent conflicts are
once again a reality in the OSCE area,
arms control regimes are dissolving, and
the risk of military incidents is rising. At
the same time, we face a broad range of
transnational threats that can only be ef-
fectively addressed through cross-border
cooperation. These include terrorism and
violent extremism, state and non-state cy-
ber threats, trafficking in people, arms,
cultural goods, and drugs, and challenges
related to illegal migration. More recent-
ly, the security implications of climate
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and technological change (especially de-
velopments in artificial intelligence) have
come to the fore. We are thus confronted
with a paradox: while multilateral coop-
eration is being questioned and spaces for
dialogue are shrinking, the need for co-
operation and genuine dialogue is greater
than ever. This situation is reflected in
the OSCE.
If responding to modern security risks
requires multilateral cooperation, how
can we strengthen the OSCE as a fo-
rum for inclusive dialogue and a facil-
itator of effective security cooperation?
What constraints does the organization
face, and how can they be overcome?
These questions were foremost on my
mind when I began my term as Secretary
General of the OSCE in 2017. Together
with my Directors, and led by the new-
ly created Strategic Policy Support Unit,
we devised the “Fit-for-Purpose” agenda,
which I presented to the participating
States in February 2018.1 Three years on,
the results are mixed. Analysis of the Fit-
for-Purpose agenda’s achievements shows
that numerous changes have been imple-
mented to increase the efficiency and
effectiveness of the OSCE. The positive
message for the future is that reform is
possible. At the same time, however, es-
sential reforms were stymied early on or
have yet to cross the finish line. There
is a clear need to sustain reform efforts
to ensure that the OSCE remains capable
of responding effectively to security chal-
lenges and makes efficient use of its limi-
ted resources.
This contribution to OSCE Insights
focuses on four topics that the Fit-for-
Purpose agenda addressed:2
• reviewing the management processes
of the Secretariat;
• ensuring adequate resourcing for the
OSCE;
• promoting the OSCE as a forum for
inclusive dialogue; and
• enhancing programmatic coopera-
tion.
I will briefly assess what has been
achieved thus far and, where we have
failed to reach set objectives, why this is
so. In conclusion, I will offer recommen-
dations to the participating States and the
Secretariat.
The achievements and failures of the
Fit-for-Purpose agenda
The management review
The OSCE Secretariat has grown organi-
cally since its establishment more than
two decades ago. Its management pro-
cesses have adapted in an ad hoc manner
to new challenges, an increasing work-
load, participating States’ changing prior-
ities, and ever tighter budgets. In addi-
tion, new technologies and modern busi-
ness practices have changed conditions
of work. These developments created
a need to systematically review the Sec-
retariat’s central management processes
with an eye to increasing effectiveness
and efficiency. For precisely this reason,
I launched the Secretariat Management
Review in April 2018, involving all Secre-
tariat staff and supported by an interna-
tional consulting firm. A total of eighty
optimization steps were pursued. By Ju-
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ly 2020, sixty-eight had been implement-
ed, five abandoned, and seven continued
in separate processes. The implemented
changes include:
• greater cost transparency through bet-
ter control and reporting instruments;
• the introduction of a new travel man-
agement tool to reduce administrative
workload and costs;
• a new online registration tool and
conference management guide;
• a reduction of the administrative
workload in procurement;
• a new electronic recruiting platform;
• online induction training for new
OSCE employees and all staff; and
• revision of the approval process for ex-
trabudgetary projects to differentiate
between low- and high-risk projects
and allow for an accelerated proce-
dure.
Other areas where processes were opti-
mized include logistics, building manage-
ment, internal coordination, communica-
tion, and the digitalization of staff man-
agement and payment. There was a pat-
tern to many of these changes: digital
technology was introduced to improve
service while cutting costs. Although the
management review was originally de-
signed not to cut costs but to redirect
resources to increase added value, savings
of around €300,000 were secured for 2019
alone. Shared service centres in areas such
as information technology support and
human resource administration, and a re-
source mobilization strategy for extrabud-
getary contributions from state and non-
state actors and for in-kind donations are
further initiatives almost ready for imple-
mentation.
Although the Secretariat Management
Review focused on processes, it also
considered organizational structure. In
a quick win, the Records Management
Unit merged with the OSCE Documenta-
tion Centre in Prague, and information
communication technologies functions
were consolidated in a specialized unit
of the Department of Management and
Finance. Other changes, however – such
as making the Ethics Coordinator and
the Gender Issues Programme directly
accountable to the Secretary General –
were met with resistance from participat-
ing States and could not be implement-
ed. Organizational changes such as these
are reflected in the post table, which is
part of the Unified Budget, and there-
fore require consensus. The same diffi-
culty arose when I attempted to create
the function of a second Deputy Head
of the Secretariat. Since the OSCE does
not want to fund a full-time Deputy
Secretary General, the task of deputiz-
ing formally rests on the already busy
Director of the Conflict Prevention Cen-
tre. I therefore appointed the Director
of the Office of the Secretary General
as second Deputy Head of the Secretari-
at. The division of tasks was clear: the
Director of the Conflict Prevention Cen-
tre took on the deputy duties for exter-
nal, conflict cycle-related business, while
the Director of the Office of the Secre-
tary General was responsible for inter-
nal, management-related issues. The prac-
tice worked perfectly and was never ques-
tioned by participating States. When I
wanted to formalize it by amending the
Making the OSCE More Effective
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post table, a head of delegation launched
a successful campaign against it and
blocked the decision, arguing that the
change had not been properly discussed
with participating States.
I briefed heads of delegation thorough-
ly about the Secretariat Management Re-
view and kept them updated through the
Secretary General’s hour and my small
group meetings with ambassadors. The
review was initially met with support
and even enthusiasm from participating
States, but interest in these managerial
issues faded over time. In the budgetary
discussions of the Advisory Committee
on Management and Finance, little ap-
preciation was shown for the resulting
gains in efficiency and effectiveness. At
the same time, a few states blocked
well-argued organizational changes to the
budget process, limiting the Secretary
General’s room for manoeuvre even in
management matters. The participating
States would do well to give the Secretari-
at some leeway and avoid micromanag-
ing. They should instead focus on the
political mechanics of achieving consen-
sus and taking joint action based on com-
mon commitments.
The tendency for participating States
to micromanage the Secretariat stands in
sharp contrast to the assertion that man-
agement responsibility and competence
are the undisputed core of the Secretary
General’s terms of reference. Paradoxical-
ly, the very states who have argued that
the Secretary General is “only” the Chief
Administrative Officer have not let the
Secretary General perform that role un-
hindered. For my part, I observed that
a clear majority of OSCE participating
States prefer an active and diplomatically
profiled Secretary General – and the Sec-
retary General’s mandate creates space for
that. In practice, there are two areas that
allow considerable scope for interpreta-
tion: one pertains to the Secretary Gen-
eral’s political and diplomatic role; the
other is the coordination that is incum-
bent on the Secretary General as Chief
Administrative Officer. While the rele-
vant Ministerial Council decisions offer
a broad outline of the Secretary Gener-
al’s political tasks,3 it is the Chairperson-
in-Office who ultimately defines the pre-
cise political scope of his or her activi-
ties. In my experience as Secretary Gen-
eral different Chairs placed different ex-
pectations on the Secretary General, to
which the Secretary General has to adapt.
The Secretary General’s role as coordina-
tor concerns both programmatic cooper-
ation among executive structures and cri-
sis management, as we witnessed during
the COVID-19 pandemic. Effective coor-
dination by the Secretariat is needed to
ensure that two top objectives, duty of
care and business continuity, are consis-
tently pursued across the entire organiza-
tion. With the increasing demand for in-
terdisciplinary answers to complex securi-
ty threats, the need for greater coordina-
tion of the OSCE’s programmatic work is
growing.
Ensuring adequate resourcing
In their policy statements, participating
States consistently highlight the relevance
of the OSCE as a forum for dialogue,
a facilitator for managing and resolving
Thomas Greminger
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conflict, and a provider of support for ad-
dressing security threats and implement-
ing OSCE commitments. However, this
does not automatically translate into pro-
viding the organization with adequate
resources. There are quite a number of
issues at stake. Here I will talk about
the budget process, the size of the Uni-
fied Budget, the timing of its adoption
and the scales of contribution. I will not
go into issues related to extra-budgetary
resources, even though they are highly
relevant given their potential to signifi-
cantly expand the resource base of the
OSCE. The resource mobilization strate-
gy mentioned above will have to include
practices and rules for making more stra-
tegic use of current extra-budgetary con-
tributions and tapping into new funding
sources like aid agencies, international
financial institutions and the private sec-
tor.
In principle, the need to reform the
budget process is undisputed among par-
ticipating States. The current process is
complex, tedious, and protracted. It in-
vites states to micromanage the financial
affairs of the Secretariat and other execu-
tive structures and to link (often narrow)
political and personal agendas to broad-
er operational issues. A longer-term bud-
get cycle would allow a more strategic
approach to planning and better align-
ment of resources with political and man-
dated activities. In 2018, a proposal for
budget reform drafted by the Secretariat
was submitted to participating States. It
contained two main elements: an exten-
sion of the Programme Outline from one
to four years and the introduction of a
two-year budget. The exact financial allo-
cation would continue to be approved
by the participating States annually. The
proposal was well received. Even a key
delegation voiced no fundamental resis-
tance – after intensive preparatory work,
including in its capital – although con-
sent was made contingent on two essen-
tial requirements: the reform exercise had
to be presented as a pilot and the Pro-
gramme Outline limited to two years,
since there was not enough confidence
in the institutions to allow for a four-year
plan.
The Italian Chairpersonship was about
to submit the reform proposal to the Per-
manent Council for adoption shortly be-
fore the 2018 summer break, when a new
obstacle appeared that ended up blocking
this and other decisions proposed by the
Secretariat for almost three quarters of a
year. It concerned a matter totally unre-
lated to budget reform, the question of
the so-called disclaimer. As this is typical
of workings in the OSCE, I will offer
some details.
In June 2018, a disclaimer was added
to documents distributed to participat-
ing States through the official document
distribution system, clarifying that the
Secretariat bore no responsibility for
their content. This was met with anger
from one participating State, which sus-
pected it to be a manoeuver against
it by another. Indeed, several participat-
ing States had regularly complained to
the Chairpersonship and the Secretariat
that the document distribution system
was being used abusively to share infor-
mation from unrecognized de facto enti-
ties. Although the disclaimer was based
on a decision by the Permanent Coun-
Making the OSCE More Effective
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cil and appeared on all documents in
a non-discriminatory manner, the partic-
ipating State in question insisted on per-
ceiving it as an unfriendly act. Countless
conversations with representatives at all
levels – from the ambassador to the for-
eign minister – could not convince it
to withdraw its opposition. It was not
until the first quarter of 2019 that the
issue was resolved thanks to an interven-
tion by the Chairperson-in-Office, Slovak
Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajcak. This
allowed other important processes to go
forward, but the momentum of the bud-
get reform could not be re-established.
Stripped-down budget documentation
and a more user-friendly Performance-
Based Programme Report were all that
remained of the first attempt at budget
reform.
A second attempt was planned for
2020, but here too, the window of oppor-
tunity opened late because the regular
budget was not approved until May. In
addition, the coronavirus crisis made con-
versations with participating States more
difficult. Despite these challenges, the di-
alogue on a two-year budget and a multi-
year Programme Outline resumed. The
introduction of a longer-term capital in-
vestment plan seemed to gain traction,
but the ensuing leadership crisis in July
2020 again dampened the drive for re-
form.
The scales of contributions, which de-
fine how much each of the fifty-seven
OSCE participating States annually pay
to the OSCE’s regular budget, have been
the subject of reform efforts for years.
The key that determines the contribu-
tions of each state is complicated and out
of date. Various attempts to modernize
the scales of contributions and to adapt
them to the current distribution of eco-
nomic power have failed. Since one par-
ticipating State in particular increasingly
tied its budget approval to revising the
contribution key, Chairpersonships were
forced to take on the difficult task of try-
ing to amend it. Although the amounts
at stake are relatively small, the discus-
sions have been politicized and in want
of pragmatism. Chairs face an impossi-
ble task as long as major stakeholders
remain unwilling to adjust the level of
their contributions. It is therefore unfair
to make approval of the Unified Budget
conditional on revised scales of contribu-
tions. This is not to say that they should
not be revised – quite the contrary. How-
ever, the problem cannot be solved on
a purely technical level, as evidenced by
the efforts of Slovakia when it chaired
the OSCE in 2019. A solution would ne-
cessitate a significant investment of polit-
ical capital by the Chair and a willing-
ness to move forward on the part of the
key stakeholders. At the same time, the
technical details, while often minute, are
important and difficult for high-ranking
diplomats and officials in capitals, who
only deal with such matters occasionally,
to grasp. Perhaps this matter requires the
attention of a former finance minister.
In 2020, unperturbed by the pressure
the coronavirus put on the functioning
of the OSCE, participating States contin-
ued a lengthy and narrow-minded discus-
sion for the approval of the 2020 Uni-
fied Budget, which should have been
adopted by Christmas 2019. Despite the
Chair’s skillful leading of the process, the
Thomas Greminger
6
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748911456, am 10.10.2021, 01:02:51
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
OSCE did not receive its regular budget
until the end of May, i.e., with a five-
month delay. Unfortunately, late budget
approval is no longer the exception but
the rule in the OSCE. Approval processes
represent a heavy burden on any Chair
and divert time, energy and attention
of participating States from dealing with
more substantive issues. They reduce the
time available to discuss reform-related
matters and massively complicate the
smooth running of the organization. As
long as there is no approved Unified Bud-
get, operations must be financed through
quarterly (and later monthly) allotments
based on the budget of the previous
year. Even worse, new programmatic ac-
tivities are not allowed to start. Timely
budget adoption is thus crucial to the ef-
fective functioning of the OSCE, and par-
ticipating States should treat it as a strate-
gic concern. Regular, desperate calls by
Chairpersons-in-Office are not sufficient;
a mechanism obliging states to adopt the
Unified Budget on time must be imple-
mented.
The lengthy 2020 Unified Budget dis-
cussions did not lead to an increase of
funds. The result, for the ninth year in
a row, was zero nominal growth. The
OSCE is thus again losing around two
per cent of its real purchasing power.
Granted, any organization can stay afloat
for some time under austerity measures,
but there are limits to how long one can
achieve more with less. These limits have
clearly been exceeded by the executive
structures of the OSCE after years of zero
nominal growth and an increase in tasks,
for example services for the benefit of the
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine
(SMM).
Some states argue that the amount
they are paying to the OSCE has in-
creased since 2014 because the SMM has
a separate budget which is almost as big
as the Unified Budget. This is true, but
what is forgotten is that the deployment
of the SMM has significantly enlarged
the workload in the Secretariat, with
no corresponding augmentation of the
Secretariat’s budget. Thanks to efficiency
gains due to the Secretariat Management
Review and the more frequent charging
of services to other executive structures,
it has been possible to prevent major de-
ficiencies in the fulfilment of mandates.
However, the time has come for partici-
pating States to either reduce tasks sub-
stantially or discard the zero nominal
growth dogma.
There is evidence that the same partici-
pating States that block approval for the
Unified Budget can do things quite dif-
ferently. The SMM budget was passed in
good time in 2020 despite an increase of
eight and a half per cent. State capitals
showed a strong interest in securing the
SMM’s resources, and when risks such as
delays in approving the budget in Vienna
threatened, unmistakable political signals
were given by the headquarters. Why the
difference? I would argue that participat-
ing States accept the well-defined role of
(and need for) the SMM. If the OSCE’s
Unified Budget were based on a clearer
set of priorities agreed by participating
States – perhaps at the level of foreign
ministers – its adoption would proceed
much more smoothly. As it stands, spoil-
ing comes at a low cost to individual
Making the OSCE More Effective
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states but hurts the organization as a
whole.
Promoting the forum for inclusive
dialogue
One of the OSCE’s strengths since its
inception as the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in
1975 is that it is a forum for inclusive dia-
logue. During the Cold War and again in
the 1990s, the CSCE (renamed the OSCE
in 1995) was a place for states to discuss
and resolve a wide range of differences.
As Chairperson of the Permanent Coun-
cil in 2014 when Switzerland led the or-
ganization, and again when I served as
Secretary General, my sense was that the
culture of dialogue and cooperation was
waning. OSCE meetings were being used
to read speeches, score points, and engage
in public diplomacy. Together with the
OSCE Chairs, I sought to recapture and
promote the organization’s unique role as
a space where fifty-seven non-likeminded
countries can come together, engage in
constructive dialogue, and build security
through cooperation. Efforts under the
Fit-for-Purpose agenda to revitalize dia-
logue in the OSCE were three-pronged:
create a strategic planning capacity in
the Secretariat, create additional oppor-
tunities for informal dialogue, and sup-
port the Structured Dialogue, the infor-
mal working group of participating States
established by the Hamburg Ministerial
Council in 2016 to discuss current and
future challenges and risks to security.
When Switzerland held the OSCE
Chair, I noticed that the Secretariat
lacked the capacity to plan for the medi-
um and long term because its policy and
coordination units were absorbed with
day-to-day business. Therefore, at the end
of 2017, I established the Strategic Pol-
icy Support Unit, financed as an extra-
budgetary project and staffed with ex-
perts seconded by the United States, the
Russian Federation, the EU, and Switzer-
land. The aim was to bring greater conti-
nuity to the OSCE’s planning processes
and to better provide the Chair and the
Troika (the current, past, and incoming
Chairs) with strategic policy advice. The
unit supported the 2019 and 2020 Chairs
(Slovakia and Albania) in formulating
their priorities, helped the Conflict Pre-
vention Centre to develop regional strate-
gic frameworks for the Western Balkans
and Central Asia, produced recommenda-
tions for prospective Chairs of the OSCE,
and studied the implications of relations
with China for the OSCE. It also con-
tributed to making the Programme Out-
line a more strategic document aligning
the allocation of budget resources with
policy priorities.
In addition to allocating regular bud-
get means more strategically, it is equal-
ly important to devise OSCE's extra-
budgetary activities in a more holistic
way. They have been growing in size and
are particularly relevant when it comes
to innovation and new thematic accents
set by the organization. With this aim in
mind the position of a Strategic Planning
and Resource Mobilization Coordinator
(SPRM) has been created.
Strategic planning in the OSCE is a
function of planning capacities in the
Secretariat on the one hand and policy
Thomas Greminger
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support and practice on the part of the
Chairpersonship, the Troika, and partic-
ipating States on the other. Although
challenging, strategically aligning the po-
litical priorities defined by the Chairper-
sonship and the Troika is of the utmost
importance. Each Chair tends to view the
OSCE through the twelve-month lens of
its leadership responsibilities. However, it
would make sense to adopt a longer-term
perspective, ideally in the form of a three-
or four-year plan. When Finland chaired
the OSCE in 2008, five consecutive chairs
met as a quintet. Switzerland and Serbia
agreed a joint work plan as successive
Chairs in 2014 and 2015. Unfortunately,
this model has not caught on. Current-
ly, the prerequisites for longer-term plan-
ning exist, with the OSCE Chairs deter-
mined until 2023 (Sweden, Poland, and
North Macedonia).
The OSCE’s formal dialogue forums
such as the Permanent Council and the
Forum for Security Co-operation have
largely become platforms for harsh, con-
frontational public diplomacy. The “Talk-
ing Points” series initiated under the Fit-
for-Purpose agenda provided a new op-
portunity for informal dialogue. Experts
were invited to the Secretariat premises
to discuss new studies and publications
with representatives of the participating
States and OSCE staff. This was also an
attempt to bring delegation members in-
to the Secretariat. Another invaluable in-
formal space for dialogue is the Security
Days initiated by my predecessor, Lam-
berto Zannier. With the Strategic Plan-
ning Support Unit, I had the necessary
capacity in the Secretariat to conceptual-
ize such events in a targeted manner and
to ensure consistent follow-up. Security
Days have recently been held on issues
such as the future of OSCE field oper-
ations, military incident prevention, sus-
tainable development goals, technologi-
cal change, and lessons of the Paris Char-
ter.
I also encouraged think tanks to create
informal space for dialogue on topical is-
sues. At my suggestion, and with the po-
litical support of Miroslav Lajcak, a con-
sortium formed by the Friedrich Ebert
Foundation and GLOBSEC launched the
Cooperative Security Initiative. The ini-
tiative aims to promote the concept of
cooperative security in mainstream Euro-
pean security policymaking and generate
new ideas for strengthening multilateral-
ism and security cooperation in Europe.
The OSCE’s Structured Dialogue, orig-
inally intended to stimulate arms con-
trol discussions,4 has in practice gener-
ated constructive exchanges on current
threat perceptions, military postures, and
measures to reduce tension. Participating
States have also shown interest in using
the forum to develop instruments to in-
crease transparency, for example a tem-
plate for major military exercises or a
best practice guide for the prevention and
management of military incidents.
I  supported  the  Structured  Dialogue
to  the  best  of  my  ability,  especially
in  my  interaction  with  governments
and organizations  like  NATO, although
participating  States,  in  particular  the
Structured Dialogue sceptics among them,
never tired of emphasizing that it is state
owned and state driven. This stems from
a fear of losing control over the process to
the broad group of states supportive of the
Making the OSCE More Effective
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dialogue, to a committed Secretariat, and
to interested think tanks and civil society
organizations.  The  Structured  Dialogue
faces risks from its key stakeholders as well,
who have mutually exclusive ideas about
its priorities. In addition, maintaining its
momentum has been challenging because
a different participating State has chaired
the informal working group each year. It
is  in  need  of  new  political  motivation,
decisive leadership, and a broader support
base to increase its  resilience.  The latter
could  include  parliamentarians,  think
tanks, the media, and civil society groups.
The  Structured  Dialogue  would  also
benefit from a more clearly defined vision
of how the discussion should evolve and
what topics it should cover.
Enhancing programmatic cooperation
The Fit-for-Purpose agenda aimed to en-
hance the OSCE’s programmatic coop-
eration, including by mobilizing new
donors and partners for cooperation.
There is growing interest in the private
sector in partnering with the OSCE
and sponsoring its activities. Other non-
traditional donors, such as international
organizations and financial institutions,
are also increasingly keen to support its
programmatic work. The OSCE has to
adapt its rules and working modalities if
it wants to seize these opportunities. Ef-
forts in this direction were kicked off un-
der the Secretariat Management Review
with the drafting of the resource mobili-
zation strategy.
Alongside the programmatic depart-
ments of the Secretariat, the OSCE’s field
operations and institutions are essential
for conducting its programmatic work.
The good news about the field missions is
that host country pressures on them have
decreased significantly in recent years.
This has a lot to do with the fact that
we have succeeded in shaping the cooper-
ation between the OSCE and host states
as a partnership and in enhancing nation-
al authorities’ sense of ownership with
respect to field operations. Today the
prevailing perception is that having the
OSCE in the country is advantageous be-
cause it helps to implement important
national reforms. In addition to strong
local ownership, a clear profile and coor-
dination with other international actors
are important factors for the effectiveness
and efficiency of the OSCE in the field.
OSCE field operations operate on the
basis  of  the comprehensive  approach to
security  and  are  required  to  develop
activities in all three dimensions. Another
comparative  advantage  of  OSCE  field
presences is their proximity to government
and  their  responsiveness  to  its  wishes.
However,  both  factors  also  expose  the
OSCE field activities to the constant risk
of  spreading  their  resources  too  thin.
It  is  essential  that  heads  of  mission
work  closely  with  host  states  to  build
a  clear  and  long-term  plan  for  their
activities.  A  multi-year  strategy  would
enable  defining  where  to  concentrate
expertise  and  invest  the  bulk  of  the
resources. This would not entail being less
responsive to government needs. It would
sharpen the OSCE’s profile in the country
and make its added value clearer. Making
the switch from the predominant “project”
approach to a “programme” mindset may
Thomas Greminger
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seem simple,  but it  requires a  complete
change  of  corporate  culture  among
both  Secretariat  and  field  operations
staff  and  donors.  In  the  framework  of
the  Secretariat  Management  Review,  a
number  of  management  processes  were
adapted for this purpose. I also initiated a
dialogue among the twelve major donors,
with a view to introducing a sustainable
programme culture.
Providing programmatic support to
participating States that have an interest
in cooperation but lack a formal OSCE
presence is another challenge. Belarus,
Armenia, and Azerbaijan undoubtedly
fall within this category. With regard to
the first two, there have already been
initial attempts to integrate individual
projects into the framework of a country
programme. However, recent experience
has revealed difficulties that require res-
olution based on general principles. Co-
operation based exclusively on extrabud-
getary financing is unsustainable, so at
some point funds from the regular bud-
get will have to be made available for
such programmes. Even in the absence of
a formal OSCE presence, rules defining
the relation to the host state are needed.
Without them, the OSCE cannot open a
local bank account or protect its employ-
ees. Coordination among OSCE execu-
tive structures is necessary if the OSCE
wants to establish a coherent country pro-
gramme and conduct political dialogue
with host authorities.
As outlined in the Fit-for-Purpose
agenda, complex security challenges re-
quire interdisciplinary responses. This
may require cooperation between differ-
ent OSCE structures to mobilize differ-
ent types of expertise and deliver a joint
product. The EU-funded trial monitoring
project in the Western Balkans, which
will be implemented from 2021, is a per-
fect illustration of this: the OSCE will
have a comparative advantage as an EU
partner if it can combine the geograph-
ic context knowledge and the proximi-
ty to local governments of its field pres-
ences with the Office for Democratic In-
stitutions and Human Rights’ expertise
in trial monitoring. This requires coordi-
nation by the Secretariat. The executive
structures of the OSCE would therefore
do well to cooperate in the spirit of the
UN motto “Deliver as One”. This is not
the approach regularly voiced by partici-
pating States, however. The “autonomy
of institutions” has become a mantra, and
calls for cooperation and coordination
among executive structures are rare. Yet
the limits of that autonomy are all too
evident when it comes to discussions on
the budget or the appointment of heads
of executive structures.
Conclusions and recommendations
Despite the mixed results  of  the Fit-for-
Purpose reform agenda, significant steps
have been taken to increase the efficiency
and effectiveness of executive structures.
This  shows that  reform of  the OSCE is
possible. The following recommendations
outline  how  participating  States  and
executive  structures  could  stimulate  it
further:
• Participating States should provide
more space and support to the Secre-
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tariat and other executive structures to
improve management processes and
organizational structures and should
refrain from micromanagement.
• Participating States should reform
and simplify the budget process, ideal-
ly by introducing a biannual budget, a
multi-year Programme Outline, and a
capital investment plan.
• The OSCE Chair should discuss and
agree in principle a revision of the
scales of contributions with participat-
ing States who are key contributors –
on the political level.
• A mechanism5 that compels partici-
pating States to adopt the Unified
Budget before Christmas should be
introduced.
• Participating States should drop the
zero nominal growth dogma and ei-
ther provide the OSCE with adequate
resources to fulfil its mandate or pur-
sue a clearer and more limited set of
priorities within a longer-term strate-
gy. The OSCE cannot continue to do
more with less.
• The strategic planning capacities of
the Secretariat should be further con-
solidated, and strategic planning tools
like the Programme Outline and a
multi-year plan by an extended Troika
further developed.
• Participating States should expand
and make full use of informal fo-
rums for genuine dialogue. The Struc-
tured Dialogue should be strength-
ened by establishing a higher pub-
lic profile, a two-year Informal Work-
ing Group chairpersonship and work
plan, and should be made more re-
silient through academic/think tank/
civil society support.
• The profile and strategic outlook of
field operations’ programmatic port-
folios should be sharpened. Manag-
ing countless small projects should be
abandoned in favour of steering well-
chosen programmes.
• Participating States should elaborate
and agree on a general procedure
for conducting programmatic work in
participating States where the OSCE
has no formal field presence. Coun-
try programmes could be financed
by both the Unified Budget and ex-
trabudgetary resources and operated
through a technical presence under
rules agreed with the host states.
• The rules should be amended and
mind-sets changed to increase coop-
eration with non-traditional partners
such as large regional organizations,
international financial institutions,
aid agencies, and private sector actors,
including foundations.
In line  with the recent  “OSCE Call  for
Action” by more than fifty former OSCE
leaders to step up “political-level engage-
ment to ensure that the OSCE maintains
its  ability  to  continue  addressing  these
[security] challenges effectively”,6 I would
encourage the Ministerial Council to agree
on  a  “compact  for  a  well-functioning
organization”.  This  would  establish  as
matters  of  political  concern  objectives
such  as  providing  the  OSCE  with  a
timely and adequate budget, overcoming
obstacles  to  adopting  the  agendas  of
routine  meetings,  and  enabling  reform.
Such a compact would represent a political
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commitment to ensuring that the OSCE
remains – or once again becomes – fit for
purpose.
Notes
1 At the Secretary General’s hour of 14
February 2018, a non-paper outlining the
ten points of the reform agenda was
made available to participating States.
2 The reform agenda covered ten areas.
This article focuses on selected thematic
clusters. The author is currently working
on a comprehensive assessment that will
be published in 2021.
3 The original mandate of the Secretary
General was defined in Stockholm
(1992). Ministerial Council Decisions
from Porto (2002), Sofia (2004), Brus-
sels (2006), and Vilnius (2011) provided
the most important amendments. See, re-
spectively: OSCE, Final Document of the
Third Meeting of the CSCE Council of
Ministers, Stockholm, 14–15 December
1992, 15 December 1992, https://www.
osce.org/mc/40342; OSCE, Final Docu-
ment of the Tenth Meeting of the OSCE
Ministerial Council, Porto, 6–7 Decem-
ber 2002, 7 December 2002, https://ww
w.osce.org/mc/40521; OSCE, Final Doc-
ument of the Twelfth Meeting of the
Ministerial Council, Sofia, 6–7 December
2004, 7 December 2004, https://www.osc
e.org/mc/41813; OSCE, Final Document
of the Fourteenth Meeting of the Minis-
terial Council, Brussels, 4 and 5 Decem-
ber 2006, 5 December 2006, https://ww
w.osce.org/mc/25065; OSCE, Final Doc-
ument of the Eighteenth Meeting of the
Ministerial Council, Vilnius, 6–7 Decem-
ber 2011, 7 December 2011, https://www.
osce.org/mc/88839.
4 Article 3 of MC.DOC/4/16 tasked the
Structured Dialogue as follows: “Today,
in Hamburg, we commit ourselves to ex-
ploring, inter alia, how the negative de-
velopments concerning the convention-
al arms control and CSBM architecture
in Europe can be reversed. Together,
we will work towards creating an en-
vironment conducive to reinvigorating
conventional arms control and CSBMs
in Europe. The strong commitment of
the OSCE participating States to full im-
plementation and further development
of arms control agreements is essential
for enhancing military and political sta-
bility within the OSCE area.” OSCE,
From Lisbon to Hamburg: Declaration
on the Twentieth Anniversary of the
OSCE Framework for Arms Control, 9
December 2016, https://www.osce.org/ch
airmanship/289496.
5 Creative ideas were put forward, for in-
stance, by Romanian Minister of Foreign
Affairs Teodor Melescanu at the 2019 In-
formal Ministerial Council in the High
Tatras. He suggested that the Unified
Budget should be submitted to the Min-
isterial Council in early December. Alter-
natively, good practices of other interna-
tional organizations should be assessed.
6 OSCE PA, OSCE Call for Action: Reaf-




ng/file; also available as a flipping book,
https://online.flippingbook.com/view/77
9749/.
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Abstract
What are the implications of China’s growing presence for the OSCE? This is a pressing issue
for the Organization and its participating States given the importance of relations with China
and their increasingly acrimonious nature. In answering this question, we analyse the impact
of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on three OSCE subregions: Central Asia, the South
Caucasus and Eastern Europe, and the Western Balkans. Our analysis draws on insights from a
wide range of sources, including papers commissioned from local and regional experts, govern-
ment and think tank reports, and a survey of the vast secondary literature on the topic. We
conclude that, while the impact of the BRI varies across the three subregions, it has significant
geopolitical and geo-economic implications that the OSCE cannot afford to ignore. Based on
our analysis, we offer recommendations for OSCE engagement with China and the BRI.
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Introduction
Since its inception in late 2013, China’s
strategy for connecting Asia, Europe, and
Africa along the historical Silk Road
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routes – the Belt and Road Initiative
(hereinafter the BRI, or “the Initiative”) –
has grown into a vast global development
project with increasing geopolitical and
geo-economic implications. Launching
the BRI during a speech at Kazakhstan’s
Nazarbayev University, Chinese President
Xi Jinping proposed that a “Silk Road
Economic Belt” should be jointly built
by China and its partners “in order to
make the economic ties closer, mutual
cooperation deeper and the space of de-
velopment broader between the Eurasian
countries”.1 Eighteen months later, in
March 2015, the Chinese National De-
velopment and Reform Commission fur-
ther elaborated on Xi’s speech, specifying
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that the aims of the BRI were to “pro-
mote the connectivity of Asian, European
and African continents and their adja-
cent seas, establish and strengthen part-
nerships among the countries along the
Belt and Road, set up all-dimensional,
multi-tiered and composite connectivity
networks, and realize diversified, inde-
pendent, balanced and sustainable devel-
opment in these countries”.2
While some of these ideas and goals
were not entirely new, the real novelty
was systematically combining all of them
into a single project and strategy. The
importance of the BRI was further under-
scored in 2017, when it was incorporated
into the Constitution of the Communist
Party of China, making it an integral part
of the Chinese state and its policies.3
Today, not only is the BRI considered
the centrepiece of China’s foreign and
economic policy, but it has matured in-
to a comprehensive strategic tool for Chi-
na’s leadership, reflecting the geopolitical
and geo-economic aspirations of a more
self-confident and assertive global power.
By 2021, Belt and Road cooperation in-
volved 140 countries and 30 internation-
al organizations, with projects in over
70 countries. Of the fifty-seven participat-
ing States of the OSCE, more than half
have signed memoranda of understand-
ing with China concerning their partici-
pation in the BRI.4
What started as the Silk Road Econo-
mic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk
Road now also includes a Polar Silk
Road, a Digital Silk Road, and a Health
Silk Road, among others.5 This expansive
design is reflected in the expected finan-
cial magnitude of the BRI, which was
calculated by PricewaterhouseCoopers in
2016 as “up to USD 1 trillion of out-
bound state financing from the Chinese
government in the next 10 years”.6 By the
end of 2020, almost $93 bn had been re-
alized through investment and construc-
tion contracts in three subregions in the
OSCE area: Central Asia ($55 bn), the
South Caucasus and Eastern Europe ($21
bn), and the Western Balkans ($18 bn).7
The OSCE and its participating States
can no longer afford to ignore Chi-
na’s significance and increasing presence
within the OSCE region and its neigh-
bourhood. The broad implications of the
BRI extend to an evolving set of geopo-
litical and geo-economic dynamics that
affect the OSCE as an institution, rela-
tions among its participating States, and
their relationship with China. This is par-
ticularly evident in the three subregions
mentioned above, where Russia and the
West have traditionally competed for in-
fluence, including through the political
and economic integration projects of the
European Union (EU) and the Eurasian
Economic Union (EAEU). While the BRI
does not (yet) operate with a similarly
institutionalized vision of integration, it
represents a potential long-term – com-
plementary, encompassing, or rival – al-
ternative to the EU and the EAEU. This
adds to the challenges that the OSCE is
already facing, particularly with regard to
its ability to deliver on its comprehensive
security mandate at a time when relations
between Russia and the West have deteri-
orated to levels not seen since the end of
the Cold War.
Analysing Chinese engagement in
these three subregions therefore provides
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a useful basis for assessing the BRI’s im-
pact on the OSCE to date. It also al-
lows us to examine likely future trajecto-
ries and to offer policy recommendations
for OSCE engagement with China and
the BRI. Such engagement must be prin-
cipled, pragmatic, and strategic to pre-
serve the integrity of the Organization
and to enable its participating States to
live up to their “commitment to the con-
cept […] of comprehensive, co-operative,
equal and indivisible security”.8
Our examination of the BRI’s impact
on the OSCE incorporates data and ana-
lysis from a comprehensive report pub-
lished by the OSCE Network of Think
Tanks and Academic Institutions,9 which
draws on eighteen specifically commis-
sioned background papers from country
and regional experts, academic and pol-
icy literature on the BRI, and a host
of original primary data, including from
Chinese, Russian, OSCE, EU, UN, and
World Bank sources. As this Report was
completed at the end of 2020, our analy-
sis has been further updated to account
for more recent developments and has
been complemented by further desk re-
search and engagement with experts.
The remainder of this paper is struc-
tured as follows. We first present findings
from the analysis of China’s presence and
activities in the subregions Central Asia,
the South Caucasus and Eastern Europe,
and the Western Balkans. We then draw
these findings together in the form of
brief conclusions, which in turn form the
basis of our policy recommendations.
Central Asia
Central Asia exemplifies many of the
key drivers of the BRI. From an econo-
mic perspective, the subregion is critical
to road and rail transit connecting Chi-
na to European markets. These connec-
tions represent strategically important al-
ternatives to existing maritime routes.
China also views economic development
and stability in Central Asia as a means
of achieving the politically important
goal of improving security in the neigh-
bouring province of Xinjiang, which in
turn will promote resilience to negative
spillover effects from Afghanistan.10 The
importance of the subregion is reflect-
ed in the level of investment by Chi-
na, which extends beyond transport infra-
structure to energy, raw materials, and
agricultural products for domestic con-
sumption.
Within the Central Asian subregion,
Kazakhstan is the key target state for
China. It accounts for nearly two-thirds
of the Chinese funds committed to the
subregion since 2005. The country has a
well-developed infrastructure, is relative-
ly politically stable, and has a national
development plan that is closely coordi-
nated with the BRI, making it an attrac-
tive target for Chinese investment. China
has also invested heavily in Kazakhstan’s
oil production, with Chinese companies
now in control of approximately 25 per
cent of the sector, while approximately 75
per cent of all Chinese uranium imports
are from Kazakhstan.11
From a geopolitical and strategic point
of view, the development of Central Asia
is important to China because the EU
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and the US have relatively limited influ-
ence there, which enables China to lock
Central Asia into its own sphere of influ-
ence. While Russia is currently the main
security provider, China is emerging as
the predominant economic player. In this
context, Moscow and Beijing have thus
far abided by a tacit division of labour,
and both have hailed the value of cooper-
ation.12 One manifestation of this cooper-
ation is the economic and trade coopera-
tion agreement between China and the
EAEU, of which Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzs-
tan are members, alongside Armenia, Be-
larus, and Russia. Although it has only
been in force since 2019, it is an indica-
tion of potentially deepening ties in the
future, especially as the West hardens its
stance on both Russia and China.
The South Caucasus and Eastern Europe
Geographically distinct, and with no
common land border with China, the
OSCE participating States in the South
Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and
Georgia) and Eastern Europe (Belarus,
Moldova, and Ukraine) have a number of
features in common that set them apart
from Central Asia and the Western Bal-
kans.
While there are individual differences
between these countries, as a whole they
are more developed than the countries
of Central Asia. However, they have dis-
played far greater political instability in
the past decade than either Central Asia
or the Western Balkans. This is evident
from the ongoing conflict in Ukraine,
the 2020 war between Armenia and
Azerbaijan, and the disputed presiden-
tial elections in Belarus, which were ac-
companied by a violent crackdown on
protesters. Three of the countries – Geor-
gia, Moldova, and Ukraine – have also
been stuck in a political and economic
tug of war between Russia and the West
for over a decade.13
Against the background of geopolitical
tensions between the West and Russia,
Chinese engagement in the region has
been modest compared to its engagement
in Central Asia. Other challenges in the
subregion relate to corruption and poor
levels of government effectiveness. The
main drivers of Chinese engagement are
largely similar to those in the other two
regions: transit and access to resources.
Along the New Eurasian Land Bridge,
BRI implementation has resulted in ma-
jor projects in Belarus, which is an indis-
pensable transit country along the Chi-
na–Kazakhstan–Russia–Belarus route to
the EU market but has also seen addi-
tional Chinese investment in industrial
projects (for example the Great Stone
China–Belarus Industrial Park). To date,
Chinese banks have provided $4.5 bn in
loans to Belarusian companies.14
In terms of actual investment, how-
ever, China’s engagement with Ukraine
has by far exceeded its engagement with
Belarus, both prior to and since the
inception of the BRI. With that said,
the potential of Chinese engagement in
Ukraine has not been fully exploited, giv-
en the ongoing conflict in the country
and related social, political, and econo-
mic instability.15
Almost 70 per cent of all Chinese
investments in Ukraine predate the offi-
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cial launch of the BRI in 2013.16 Thus
far, these investments have been focused
on the energy sector (solar power) and
agriculture (e.g. a newly built grain ter-
minal in Mykolaiv facilitating Ukrainian
exports to China). Attempts by China
to gain a foothold in Ukraine’s military-
industrial complex have encountered sig-
nificant pushback from Kyiv, as in the
case of Motor Sich, a producer of military
aircraft engines.
Moldova, by contrast, is hardly inte-
grated with the BRI, given the country’s
peripheral location in relation to the
main economic corridors, its low levels of
economic development, its small domes-
tic market, and its predominantly rural
economy.17
The South Caucasus in general offers
limited connectivity options to China be-
cause of the absence of a viable deep-sea
port in Georgia, despite several attempts
by China to develop facilities in Anaklia
for that purpose.18 Nevertheless, China
and Azerbaijan have signed a memoran-
dum of understanding and other bilater-
al agreements, which have resulted in an
increase in bilateral trade and an estimat-
ed $821 m economic package for Azerbai-
jan focused on Chinese investment in the
non-oil sector.19
In Armenia, investment has been
marginal, but this could change follow-
ing the conclusion of an agreement be-
tween China and Armenia for the devel-
opment of a “smart city” worth $10–15
bn over the next fifteen years.20
The Western Balkans
The Western Balkans subregion compris-
es Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North
Macedonia, Serbia, and Slovenia. The
subregion has achieved significantly high-
er levels of development than the coun-
tries in Central Asia and the South Cau-
casus and Eastern Europe. It has been
largely dominated by Western influence
over the past quarter-century, which is
now being challenged by China.
The main driver of the expansion of
the BRI into the Western Balkans is ac-
cess to European markets. Developing the
infrastructure of the Western Balkans is
thus considered strategically important
for improving access to the EU.
The main risks are related to unre-
solved legacies of the violent disintegra-
tion of the former Yugoslavia, including
persistent inter-ethnic tensions and sim-
mering contestations over borders. The
region also suffers from governance prob-
lems, such as corruption and weak rule of
law.
Serbia has thus far received the largest
share (60 per cent) of Chinese investment
in the region. While a wide range of
projects have been pursued in the energy
sector and local transport, the flagship
project of the BRI in Serbia remains the
construction of the Belgrade–Budapest
railway, linking the Serbian and Hungari-
an capitals. The railway is a critical node
in the Balkan Silk Road from the Greek
port of Piraeus to the EU. The partial
construction of the Belgrade–South Adri-
atic highway is of similar strategic impor-
tance.
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Belgrade and Beijing have also inten-
sified their police cooperation in recent
years, with joint patrols by Serbian and
Chinese police officers in the Serbian
capital and other cities. Serbia is the only
country in the subregion to which China
has sold military equipment and where
there have been joint military and coun-
terterrorism exercises.21
Most other key Chinese projects in
the Western Balkans relate to transport
infrastructure, underscoring the subre-
gion’s importance as a critical node in
the connections between China and the
EU. They include the Arbër motorway
in Albania (connecting the capital Tirana
to the North Macedonian border) as part
of a transport corridor intended to con-
nect the Ionian Sea to the Bulgarian coast
of the Black Sea; the Pelješac bridge in
Croatia (implemented by the China Road
and Bridge Corporation and co-funded
by the EU); the Bar–Boljare highway in
Montenegro (linking the port of Bar on
the Adriatic Sea to Serbia and funded by
an €800 m loan from Exim Bank, exacer-
bating Montenegro’s already serious debt
problem); the Kičevo–Ohrid and the Mi-
ladinovci–Štip highways in North Mace-
donia (along the transport corridor link-
ing the Greek port of Piraeus to the Hun-
garian capital of Budapest); and the inte-
gration of the Port of Koper in Slovenia
into the BRI through a deal to increase
ship connections and trade with China’s
Ningbo Zhousan Port Group.
While Chinese investments and con-
struction contracts in Croatia and Slove-
nia demonstrate China’s willingness and
ability to abide by EU rules, China’s main
investment in Bosnia and Herzegovina
– a combined $1.3 bn for the Tuzla 7
Lignite Power Plant and the Stanari Pow-
er Plant – runs counter to the country’s
obligation to comply with EU rules re-
garding state aid and environmental pro-
tection.
Conclusion
China’s increasing presence in the three
subregions examined above exemplifies
the magnitude of the geopolitical and
geo-economic implications of the BRI for
the OSCE and its participating States. In
order to appreciate the full extent of their
significance and to make relevant recom-
mendations to the OSCE, it is important
to place them in the broader context of
current developments within the OSCE
region.
The deterioration of the relationship
between the West and Russia, on the
one hand, and the West and China, on
the other, shows no sign of abating. At
the same time, all OSCE participating
States and China share an overarching
interest in security and stability across the
Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian area. This rep-
resents the most promising opportunity
for the OSCE to engage with China. The
clout that an organization of fifty-seven
participating States stretching across the
Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian area could
bring to such engagement, however, de-
pends significantly on the OSCE’s ability
to reaffirm and reinvigorate its spirit as
a comprehensive and cooperative security
organization.
China represents a seemingly attractive
model of stable governance and success-
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ful economic development domestically
and has demonstrated a willingness and
ability to contribute to, and shape, glob-
al governance.22 This increasing engage-
ment in the provision of public goods has
given China a greater stake in the pro-
cesses through which the rules of global
governance are made and enforced. Be-
cause of its predominantly bilateral char-
acter, the BRI is not (yet) a typical inte-
gration project with its own rules-based
system of governance (like the EU or the
EAEU). With that said, there is potential
for this to develop in the future, includ-
ing in ways that rival and potentially
replace existing international governance
structures.
China has promoted a comprehensive
understanding of security for some time.
In a speech at the Fourth Summit of
the Conference on Interaction and Con-
fidence Building Measures in Asia (CI-
CA) in Shanghai in 2014, Chinese Pres-
ident Xi argued for a “common, com-
prehensive, cooperative, and sustainable”
approach to security. For Xi, comprehen-
sive security means “upholding security
in both traditional and non-traditional
fields”, including “ethnic and religious
problems […] terrorism, transnational
crimes, environmental security, cyber se-
curity, energy and resource security and
major natural disasters”.23 This vision of
security has been firmly integrated in the
BRI: in its report on the implementation
of the Initiative in 2019, the Office of
the Leading Group for Promoting the
Belt and Road Initiative reproduced Xi’s
2014 remarks almost verbatim, stating
that “all countries should foster a vision
of common, comprehensive, cooperative
and sustainable security”.24
The current divisions within the OSCE
risk leading to further dysfunctionality
and an inability to deliver on core aspects
of its comprehensive security mandate.
If this occurs, OSCE participating States
that are already closely tied to China
(such as those in Central Asia) or that
have pivoted to China for geopolitical
and geo-economic reasons (such as Rus-
sia) may find China-led institutions like
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO) to be a more credible platform for
multilateral engagement on the Belt and
Road Initiative. The SCO already close-
ly mirrors parts of the OSCE’s mandate
(although it critically lacks its human di-
mension) and complements the BRI not
least in representing a multilateral mech-
anism for addressing security risks. As
SCO Secretary General Rashid Alimov
observed in May 2017, with the conclu-
sion of an agreement on favourable con-
ditions for road transportation, the SCO
has “established [the] legal basis for parity
conditions for road transporters and set
forth a single platform for international
road transportation from Eastern Europe
to [the] Russian Far East and China”,25
further cementing its complementarity
with the BRI. This complementarity has
been emphasized by Chinese, Russian,
and Central Asian analysts for some time
and may further indicate a gradual shift
away from Russian opposition to a gen-
uinely broader mandate for the SCO in
practice.26
As the major powers continue to pur-
sue their interest in securing and expand-
ing their respective spheres of influence,
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and as this interest increasingly drives
foreign policy in and toward the OSCE
region, the Organization’s potential role
as a forum for negotiating these rival
aspirations is increasing. China must be
brought into such negotiations, albeit not
necessarily into the OSCE itself. Whether
this can be done depends on participat-
ing States’ ability and willingness to de-
velop and implement a coherent strategy
to underpin such an approach, which, in
turn, depends in part on a realistic and
evidence-based assessment of China’s cur-
rent presence in the OSCE region and an
understanding of future scenarios.
Recommendations
Regardless of China’s emphasis on the
economic focus of the BRI and its win–
win approach, a project as grand and am-
bitious as this is bound to have geopo-
litical and geo-economic consequences.
While there is uncertainty about what
these are, when and how they will mate-
rialize, and whether they are inevitable
but unintended consequences or part of
an unarticulated Chinese grand strategy,
China and its BRI are a challenge that the
OSCE must face head-on.
Rising to this challenge requires a re-
alistic assessment of the prospects of con-
structive engagement between the OSCE
and China. Three potential obstacles
must be acknowledged up front. First,
it is not clear that participating States
would benefit from OSCE engagement
with China, as this may limit the gains
they can obtain from direct bilateral en-
gagement or through different formats,
such as the EU, the EAEU, and the SCO.
Second, engaging with China may simply
be a “bridge too far” for the OSCE. Giv-
en the already fractious relations among
its participating States, it could further
undermine its capacity to deliver on its
existing mandate and preserve its estab-
lished norm consensus. Third, it is far
from clear that the OSCE is the kind of
forum with which China would want to
engage, nor is it clear under what condi-
tions it would agree to do so.
These hurdles neither diminish the
need for engagement nor make engage-
ment impossible. Rather, they set the pa-
rameters within which a strategy for en-
gagement could be developed and imple-
mented. Based on the analysis above and
the more comprehensive Network Report
on which it draws, we submit the follow-
ing ideas for further consideration by pol-
icymakers in the OSCE and its participat-
ing States.
Form a minimal consensus on
engagement with China.
OSCE executive structures and institu-
tions, as well as the Chair and the Troi-
ka, should begin by identifying future
scenarios for relations with China. Using
scenario planning as a tool for both con-
sensus building and policymaking could
be helpful in sensitizing participating
States to the implications of China’s pres-
ence and activities. This could provide
them with a better understanding of the
related challenges and opportunities and
imbue them with a sense of agency with-
out insisting on reconciling diametrically
Stefan Wolff and Stephanie Liechtenstein
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opposed views on China. It could thus
provide a foundation for an initially min-
imal consensus within the OSCE on prag-
matic engagement with China.
Pursue an approach to China that is
principled, pragmatic, and strategic.
A pragmatic approach to China should
implement a policy of multi-channel en-
gagement that creates and embraces op-
portunities for dialogue in areas that have
been prioritized by the OSCE while also
being open to the issues China wishes
to raise. This should include an openness
to ad hoc and informal modes of engage-
ment.
At the same time, pragmatism should
be firmly based on OSCE principles and
guided by a strategic vision that includes
a future formal relationship with Chi-
na. This could initially involve granting
China observer status in the OSCE and
gradually evolve into a partnership more
specifically tailored to China’s size and
significance. A potential OSCE Summit
in 2025 would be an appropriate forum
for formalizing such a relationship.
Seek formats for multilateral
engagement.
The OSCE should consider engaging
with China in the context of the SCO
on issues of mutual interest, including
combatting organized crime (especially
drug trafficking), protecting critical na-
tional and transnational infrastructure,
and stabilizing the evolving situation in
Afghanistan. This could also involve en-
gagement with other international orga-
nizations, such as CICA.
Jointly manage the environmental
impact.
Using existing international frameworks
(such as the 1998 Aarhus Convention),
the OSCE should consider initiating a
formal dialogue with China on managing
the environmental impact of the BRI on
its participating States. Here, the OSCE
could provide a forum in which common
rules and principles of environmental
governance can be negotiated.
Develop a Connectivity 2.0 agenda.
The  OSCE  should  consider  developing
a  Connectivity  2.0  agenda  that  ensures
that  the  overlapping (but  not  identical)
visions  of  connectivity  held  by  the
OSCE,  China,  the  EU,  and  the  EAEU
can become and remain compatible and
complementary  despite  their  different
normative  underpinnings.  This  could
contribute to a sustainable and inclusive
post-pandemic  recovery  focused  on
strengthening the resilience of economies,
societies, and institutions.27
This will only be possible through the
collective effort of all of these interna-
tional stakeholders. The OSCE, through
its convening and agenda-setting power,
could provide a forum for discussing
smart, new approaches to ensuring the
OSCE Engagement with China: Why and How?
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continued free movement of goods, cap-
ital, people, and ideas, to counteracting
protectionist tendencies, and to sustain-
ing effective and fair national and inter-
national public administrations.
Involve China within a human rights
framework.
At present, there is little room for en-
gagement with China on human rights
issues. China’s recent actions speak for
themselves: the initial cover-up of the
coronavirus outbreak, the crackdown on
protests in Hong Kong and changes to
the electoral system, the silencing of hu-
man rights defenders, and the detention
of the Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims
in Xinjiang.
Yet China clearly accepts that fragile
institutions and weak rule of law pose
a challenge to BRI implementation. Chi-
na also recognizes that social and eco-
nomic inequalities fuel grievances that
drive conflict and instability. Thus far,
China’s answer to this has been economic
development without any concomitant
political liberalization. This is unlikely to
change in its own domestic policies, nor
should it be part of the OSCE agenda.
A shared interest in stability and se-
curity creates opportunities for engag-
ing with China within a comprehensive
framework in which human and minor-
ity rights are firmly established. In the
context of a principled, pragmatic, and
strategic approach to engagement with
China, this has two implications. First,
the human dimension of the OSCE must
not be excluded from OSCE–China rela-
tions. Second, engagement with China
must not lead to a weakening of the hu-
man dimension within the OSCE’s com-
prehensive approach to security.
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Introduction
The EU and the OSCE find themselves at
a critical juncture regarding their role in
the European security order. The EU has
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framed its options for dealing with “new
and increasing threats and challenges” in
the form of a Strategic Compass that aims
to “strengthen a common European secu-
rity and defence culture” and to “define
the right objectives and concrete goals for
[its future] policies”.1 According to the
EU Institute for Security Studies, the pur-
pose of the Strategic Compass is “to pro-
Stefan Wolff





https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748911456, am 10.10.2021, 01:02:51
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
vide political direction for the EU’s secu-
rity and defence and improve the Union’s
operational effectiveness, resilience, capa-
bilities and cooperation with partners”.2
The OSCE faces a different set of chal-
lenges, including deepening internal ten-
sions and a diminishing capacity to ful-
fil its comprehensive security mandate.3
These tensions have led to the erosion
of consensus on the norms that have un-
derpinned the OSCE since the 1970s and
a weakening of its executive structures
and institutions.4 This, in turn, has led
to a decline in the perceived political val-
ue of the Organization and participating
States’ willingness to expend political and
financial capital on it. As Wolfgang Zell-
ner argues, despite the clear need for the
OSCE “as an inclusive platform and an
actor in settings where other IOs [interna-
tional organizations] cannot act”,5 it has
become marginalized in the European se-
curity order.
While the partnership “basket” of the
EU’s Strategic Compass offers a fresh op-
portunity for the EU and the OSCE to
consider the nature of their strategic part-
nership, cooperation between them has
a much longer history. Their shared in-
terests and the benefits of cooperation
have frequently been stressed by repre-
sentatives of both organizations.6 In its
2016 Global Strategy, the EU formally ac-
knowledged the OSCE “as a Europe-wide
organisation [that] lies at the heart of the
European security order” and committed
to “strengthen[ing] its contribution with-
in and its cooperation with the OSCE
as a pillar of European security”.7 It re-
iterated its support for the OSCE in its
2019 review of the Strategy.8 This shared
interest in security and stability has also
manifested itself in prioritizing good gov-
ernance, fighting organized crime, tack-
ling corruption, and acting on the securi-
ty challenges posed by climate change.9
As many scholars have pointed out,
however, in reality the two organizations
have not taken a joint approach to secu-
rity issues, tending to work in parallel
rather than together.10 Despite positive
examples to the contrary, such as the
cooperation between the current OSCE
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine
and the European Union Advisory Mis-
sion in Ukraine, this trend has become
stronger and more pervasive. Tensions
within the OSCE have grown, and the
EU has begun to strive for greater strate-
gic autonomy as a security actor in Euro-
pe, especially since the 2007 Treaty of Lis-
bon. While a more capable and assertive
EU can (and should) make more mean-
ingful contributions to European securi-
ty, we argue that this should not be at the
expense of the OSCE. To the contrary,
not only is “the OSCE’s survival […] ob-
jectively in the EU’s best interest”,11 but a
strengthened OSCE would best serve the
national interests of the 27 (EU member
states) and the 57 (OSCE participating
States).12
In the following, we propose three
building blocks for an improved partner-
ship. The first is a realistic assessment
of what enhanced cooperation between
the EU and the OSCE can achieve. The
OSCE cannot become an instrument of
EU security interests alone; it must be
strengthened as an autonomous security
actor with capabilities that differ func-
tionally from those of the EU but are
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relevant to the management of security
challenges in areas of common interest.
Second, the EU needs to understand,
use, and strengthen the OSCE as a forum
for dialogue and mutual assurance. This
requires greater openness to engagement
with stakeholders in Russia and countries
“east of the EU” on the meaning and
interpretation of existing OSCE commit-
ments and on contested concepts such
as “sovereignty” and “self-determination”,
thereby ensuring that the hardening divi-
sions in the European security order do
not become permanent.13
Third, a clearer focus on converging
interests among the 27 and the 57 would
translate to a back-to-basics approach
that avoids duplication and capitalizes on
the main strengths of both organizations
across all three dimensions.
We develop this argument in several
steps. In the next section, we provide
a brief overview of the current state of
EU–OSCE cooperation. In section three,
we discuss its complementarities and ob-
stacles in light of the academic debate
on inter-organizational cooperation. In
section four, we conclude with policy rec-
ommendations.
The state of EU–OSCE cooperation
Notwithstanding the EC/EU’s commit-
ment to CSCE/OSCE principles, as evi-
denced in the signing of the Helsinki
Final Act (1975), the Charter of Paris
(1990), and the Charter for European Se-
curity (1999), cooperation was not taken
up in earnest as a topic until the early
2000s, on the basis of the OSCE’s “Plat-
form for Co-operative Security” (1999)14
and the European Council’s conclusions
on “EU–OSCE Cooperation in Conflict
Prevention, Crisis Management and Post-
Conflict Rehabilitation” (2003).15 The lat-
ter highlighted the need to “avoid du-
plication” and to work towards “effect-
ive complementarity”, singling out fact-
finding missions, in-field coordination,
and reciprocal diplomatic support as co-
operation priorities.16
Since 2006, the EU has been accorded
a formal role within the OSCE: “At the
meetings of the decision-making bodies,
the European Commission shall have one
seat next to the participating State hold-
ing the EU Presidency” and “may take
the floor immediately after [that state]”.17
This was further formalized at the inter-
service level in 2018 in an exchange of
letters between the Secretaries General of
the OSCE, the European Commission,
and the European External Action Ser-
vice, in which both organizations com-
mitted to regular consultations and oper-
ational cooperation in areas of common
interest.18 In addition, the High Repre-
sentative of the Union for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy and Vice-President
of the European Commission usually at-
tends the annual OSCE Ministerial Coun-
cil meeting in December.
The work of the EU at the OSCE is
managed by the Union’s Delegation to
the International Organizations in Vien-
na, where seven staff members are ded-
icated to specific OSCE institutions or
topical dimensions.19 In addition, the
European Council has a Working Party
on the OSCE and the Council of Europe,
which handles the EU’s relations with
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these two organizations and coordinates
member states’ common positions on de-
bates in both organizations.20
As for the OSCE, its participating
States have been unable to reach consen-
sus on the establishment of a liaison of-
fice in Brussels. In Vienna, the External
Co-operation Department of the Office of
the Secretary General and a Senior Exter-
nal Co-operation Officer (for all Brussels-
based institutions) are responsible for
OSCE–EU relations. The OSCE’s lack of
more direct liaison structures, especially
in field missions, has made the systemat-
ic coordination of activities with Brussels
difficult.
Until recently, both organizations have
opted for flexibility with respect to the
format of cooperation, with irregular
meetings of the EU and OSCE Troikas,
meetings between the OSCE Secretary
General and the High Representative of
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Securi-
ty Policy, and annual staff-level meetings.
The 2018 exchange of letters identified
areas of common interest that reflect al-
most the entire spectrum of OSCE activ-
ities, including conflict prevention and
mediation, the fight against terrorism,
and promotion of the rule of law and
good governance. This makes agenda-
setting and strategic prioritization diffi-
cult. The difficulty is further compound-
ed by the fluctuation of high-level person-
nel on both sides and structural incom-
patibilities, which make it hard to identi-
fy the right interlocutors and to establish
effective relationships between them.
Complementarities and obstacles
Research on inter-organizational cooper-
ation has found that resource exchange
is the main incentive for cooperation
among organizations. International orga-
nizations cooperate because they are in-
terested in, or depend on, the specific ma-
terial (project funds, infrastructure, per-
sonnel) or immaterial goods (legitimacy,
expertise, reputation) the respective part-
ner can provide.21 Resource exchange is
thus based on complementary interests
between cooperating organizations. Poli-
cy convergence can also be an important
trigger for cooperation and resource ex-
change.
The EU has become a key source of
funding for the OSCE in areas where
EU interests and OSCE needs converge.
The EU is by far the main contributor to
the OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission
to Ukraine, providing personnel, equip-
ment, and satellite imagery.22 With its
network of delegations in the OSCE area,
it is also able to provide tailor-made sup-
port to OSCE field missions.
The OSCE, for its part, has significant
(albeit currently diminishing) convening
and agenda-setting power, expertise and
tools for conflict prevention, experience
in quiet diplomacy, and a genuinely mul-
tilateral conflict-related mandate. Com-
pared to the EU, which is not perceived
as a neutral actor in the OSCE region’s
protracted conflicts, the OSCE is more
likely to be accepted as a mediator and/or
monitor on the ground. Notwithstanding
the current political divisions between
the OSCE’s participating States, the or-
ganization remains one of the few pan-
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European dialogue fora and is therefore
useful to the EU in the context of institu-
tionalized interaction with Russia on se-
curity issues and beyond. In the field the
OSCE still commands superior expertise
in comparison with the EU, concerning,
for example, conflict mediation. OSCE
field missions can assist the EU, for exam-
ple in identifying the positions and needs
of national minorities. Finally, the OSCE
can be a link, via its Central Asian partici-
pants, for the implementation of the EU’s
Central Asia Strategy.
Cooperation presupposes the existence
of certain conditions beyond the re-
source needs of an organization, how-
ever. Among them are the preferences
of member states, the power asymmetries
between the latter and the organization,
the culture and openness of the organi-
zation, the role of inter-organizational
learning or previous “cooperation paths”,
and the impact of powerful third par-
ties.23 Among the obstacles to a more
active partnership between the EU and
the OSCE is their asymmetry in terms
of power, budget, and structural charac-
teristics. The EU is not an international
organization per se. It commands multi-
billion-euro budgets, and its institutions
have considerable agency. Even in its for-
eign affairs, the Union increasingly de-
viates from inter-governmental decision-
making. On the opposite end of the spec-
trum, the OSCE is a more fragmented
organization, with a cumbersome legal
status, mandatory consensus in decision-
making, and an annual budget of just un-
der €140 million.24 A major consequence
of this asymmetric relationship is the
OSCE’s understandable fear (shared by
significant participating States) of being
pushed into a dependent role by the EU
or of becoming a tool of EU foreign and
security policy.
Further ambivalence arises from mem-
bership, mandates, and aspirations. Al-
though the OSCE includes all twenty-
seven EU member states, it also includes
Russia, all other post-Soviet countries, the
US, Canada, Norway, and the UK.25 With
much more variety in terms of regime
types and foreign policy orientations, the
OSCE lacks the coherence (and hence
the political and economic leverage) of
the EU and understands itself more as
a “forum” than a full-fledged internation-
al organization.26 For effective coopera-
tion, EU member states must therefore
distinguish between their preferences as
EU members and as OSCE participating
States. If the EU does not treat the OSCE
as a security organization in its own
right, closer EU–OSCE cooperation, and
thus a more visible EU presence and in-
fluence in the OSCE, will be unaccept-
able to Russia and other non-EU partici-
pating States.
Concerning mandates and aspirations,
the EU has significantly and increasingly
invested in becoming a security organiza-
tion. By contrast, the OSCE is struggling
to remain relevant in its core fields of
conflict prevention and mediation, pur-
suing issues on which all participating
States can agree but which are marginal
to its mandate and could be more effec-
tively addressed in other arenas. This rais-
es questions about the extent to which
the EU needs the OSCE at all in pursuing
its own interests and whether inevitable
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duplications may contribute to the fur-
ther marginalization of the OSCE.
Finally, successful cooperation be-
tween international organizations de-
pends on careful relationship manage-
ment, especially with respect to overlap
in membership. This means developing a
genuine vision of cooperation, convening
on a regular basis, and designing the pro-
cesses of interaction.27 Relationship man-
agement between the EU and the OSCE
remains a work in progress. The current
relationship is under-institutionalized,
and even after the 2018 exchange of let-
ters, top officials admit that further ef-
forts are needed. Indeed, there seems to
be no straightforward design for cooper-
ation, for example linking the different
OSCE entities with the Commission’s
capabilities and funding instruments of
conflict prevention and management.
Moreover, the list of specific cooperation
areas is incoherent and overly long; iden-
tifying priorities and clear benchmarks
would therefore make sense. Another
critical aspect is the oft-applauded ev-
eryday informal cooperation, for which
there is little actual evidence – in con-
trast to the frequent duplication and par-
allel work documented in the research.28
A more promising avenue for relation-
ship management is the role that Helga
Schmid could play as former Secretary
General of the EEAS and current Secre-
tary General of the OSCE, functioning
as a genuine “boundary spanner” and en-
abling the two organizations to cooperate
more effectively.
Policy recommendations: Areas for
enhanced cooperation
Building on our proposed three building
blocks for improved partnership, we re-
commend seven steps that the OSCE and
its participating States and the EU and
its member states could take to enhance
their cooperation. Together, they consti-
tute a new approach that (1) is based on
a realistic assessment of what enhanced
cooperation between the EU and the
OSCE can achieve; (2) is characterized
by a greater degree of openness on the
part of the EU to engagement with stake-
holders in Russia and countries “east of
the EU” within the OSCE context; and
(3) avoids duplication, capitalizing on
the main strengths of both organizations
across all three dimensions.
Strengthening prevention
The  EU  and  the  OSCE  have  different
but partially overlapping strengths regard-
ing  conflict  prevention.  The  EU  has
better  developed  structural  prevention
instruments, while the OSCE has the track
record  and  capacity  to  deal  with  direct
prevention but  often lacks  the financial
resources to act swiftly. Enhanced cooper-
ation could thus take the form of greater
integration  of  prevention  strategies  and
their  operationalisation.  The OSCE could
help  the  EU to  define  better  and more
precise prevention-related benchmarks in
its various strategies, action plans, and pro-
grammes. In turn, the EU should upscale
its financial support (for example through
its  Neighbourhood,  Development  and
a)
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International Cooperation Instrument) to
enable multi-annual OSCE budgets. This
could focus  on intensifying cooperation
in  confidence-building  measures  in  the
context of the OSCE region’s protracted
conflicts and on the High Commissioner
on National Minorities.
Reprioritizing arms control
Once  a  cornerstone  of  OSCE  activity
and  success,  arms  control  norms  and
mechanisms  have  eroded  as  tensions
within  the  Organization  have  increased
and conflicts  have escalated to violence.
The  OSCE  Structured  Dialogue  on
current  and  future  challenges  and  risks
to  security  in  the  OSCE area,  launched
by  OSCE  foreign  ministers  at  the
Ministerial  Council  in  Hamburg  in
December 2016, has the potential to make
a  crucial  contribution  to  restoring  an
effective  arms  control  regime.  An  EU
contribution to strengthening the effectiveness
of  the  Structured  Dialogue  could  include
greater preparedness to discuss it  in EU
fora,  including  in  the  European  Union
Military Committee and the Political and
Security Committee. In turn, EU experts
could  take  part  in  informal  working
groups  and  expert-level  meetings  of
military representatives in the framework
of  the  Structured  Dialogue,  thereby
demonstrating the Union’s political and
diplomatic support.
Facilitating connectivity
The EU and the OSCE each have connec-
tivity agendas. Within the OSCE region
b)
c)
“east of the EU”, the Eurasian Economic
Union represents an alternative to the
EU’s political and economic integration
project. Moreover, China’s Belt and Road
Initiative offers a third vision of connec-
tivity. EU–OSCE cooperation could of-
fer an opportunity to address competition
between the different integration projects
and to begin to work out basic rules that
would facilitate greater compatibility. The
EU could support OSCE efforts to articu-
late a coherent Connectivity 2.0 agenda29
aimed at contributing to a sustainable
and inclusive post-pandemic recovery. As
connectivity is increasingly also a securi-
ty issue, the 27 and the 57 have very
clear common interests when it comes to
the nexuses between climate and security,
technology and security, and governance
and security. EU-supported OSCE initia-
tives that foster confidence building in
the economic and environmental dimen-
sion – for example in the Caspian, Black,
and Mediterranean Seas – could serve
as access points to critical regions, gen-
erate tangible benefits for the local pop-
ulations, and eventually become a path
towards an inclusive and constructive de-
bate on hard security issues.
Countering norm erosion
The OSCE’s comprehensive security con-
cept rests on foundations agreed upon
by the participating States in Helsinki
in 1975 and Paris in 1990 and was reaf-
firmed in the 2010 Astana Commemo-
rative Declaration. As these foundations
have come under increasing attack over
the past decade, EU–OSCE cooperation
d)
Towards a More Strategic Partnership
7
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748911456, am 10.10.2021, 01:02:51
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
should focus on building alliances of norm-
defending states active in both organizations
and reflecting a balance of opinions across
the 27 and the 57. This could take the
form of a “Group of Friends” that in-
cludes both EU and non-EU participating
States east and west of Vienna and/or fo-
cus on specific OSCE institutions, such




The EU has delegations in all OSCE par-
ticipating States, and the OSCE currently
has operations in thirteen participating
States (all “east of the EU”). Nevertheless,
cooperation is often ad hoc, extends only
to political support, and rarely offers a
sustainable source of financing for under-
resourced and over-stretched OSCE pres-
ences on the ground. Hence, establishing
and consolidating links between EU delega-
tions, EU Special Representatives, and mem-
ber states’ embassies, on the one hand, and
OSCE missions, Special Representatives of
the Chairperson-in-Office, and other field
presences, on the other, should become a
priority area of EU–OSCE cooperation.
This could focus on education-related
and other youth-focused initiatives.
Increasing knowledge exchange and
joint training opportunities
The creation of a joint EU–OSCE pool of
civilian experts and organizing joint training
sessions would facilitate “inter-deployability”
and a mutual understanding of each organi-
e)
f)
zation’s institutional culture. Possibilities
that could be explored include increased
support by the EU or individual member
states for the OSCE Academy in Bishkek
or in-kind contributions from EU mem-
ber states for pre-deployment training of
OSCE staff. The latter could be modelled
on the pre-deployment training courses
for the Special Monitoring Mission to
Ukraine run by the Austrian Armed
Forces International Centre.30
Utilizing Track 2/Track 1.5 initiatives
The above recommendations could be
strengthened by more systematic support
from both organizations for Track 2 or
Track 1.5 initiatives to explore views and
perceptions across a broader range of partici-
pating States on the forms that enhanced
EU–OSCE cooperation might take, the
specific expectations of the 27 and the
57, and the red lines for non-EU partici-
pating States. This would be in keeping
with our key assumption that any discus-
sion of EU–OSCE cooperation must fo-
cus on strengthening the OSCE as the
primary comprehensive and cooperative
security organization in the Euro-Atlantic
and Eurasian area.
Notes
1 European External Action Service, “To-
wards a Strategic Compass”, May 2021,
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/t
owards_a_strategic_compass.pdf
2 European Union Institute for Security
Studies, “Finding direction with a Strate-
gic Compass? Reflections on the future
g)
David Galbreath, André Härtel and Stefan Wolff
8
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748911456, am 10.10.2021, 01:02:51
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
of EU security and defence”, 2021, p. 2,
https://www.2021portugal.eu/media/5e3
pjuwv/event-report-strategic-compass.pdf
3 Thomas Greminger, “Making the OSCE
More Effective: Practical Recommenda-
tions from a Former Secretary Gener-
al”, IFSH (ed.), OSCE Insights 1/2021,
Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2021, https://doi.o
rg/10.5771/9783748911456-01 https://doi.
org/10.5771/9783748911456-01
4 Global Europe Program Working Group
on the Future of the OSCE, “Uncommon
Cause: The Future of the OSCE”, in:
TransAtlantic 2/2021, pp. 2-4, https://ww
w.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/
media/uploads/documents/Uncommon
Cause - The Future of the OSCE v2.pdf
5 Wolfgang Zellner, Using the OSCE More
Effectively: Ideas and Recommendations,




6 See, for example, Benita Ferrero-
Waldner, “The European Union and
the OSCE: Natural Partners in a Net-
worked World”, in: IFSH (ed.), OSCE
Yearbook 2006, Baden-Baden: Nomos,
2007, 407-409, https://doi.org/10.5771/9
783845201740-404
7 European Commission, Shared vision,
common action: A stronger Europe (A
global strategy for the European Union’s




8 See European Commission, cited above
(Note 7); European Union, The Euro-
pean Union’s Global Strategy: Three
years on, looking forward, 2019, https:/
/eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_global_
strategy_2019.pdf
9 See, for example, European External Ac-
tion Service and European Commission,
20 deliverables for 2020: Monitoring-





10 Hylke Dijkstra et al., “The EU’s Part-
ners in Crisis Response and Peacebuild-
ing: Complementarities and Synergies
with the UN and the OSCE”, in: Glob-
al Affairs 2-3/2018, 185-196; David Gal-
breath, “Convergence Without Cooper-
ation? The EU and the OSCE in the
Field of Peacebuilding”, in: Steven Block-
mans/Jan Wouters/Tom Ruys (eds.), The
European Union and Peacebuilding: Pol-
icy and Legal Aspects, The Hague: Asser
Press, 2010, 175-194.
11 Alyson J. K. Bailes/Jean-Yves Haine/
Zdzislaw Lachowski, “Reflections on the
OSCE–EU Relationship”, in IFSH (ed.),
OSCE Yearbook 2007, Baden-Baden:
Nomos, 2008, 65-77, https://ifsh.de/file
-CORE/documents/yearbook/english/07/
BailesHaineLachowski-en.pdf, p. 76
12 See also Deutscher Bundestag, Antrag
der Fraktionen CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP
und BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN: 45
Jahre Schlussakte von Helsinki, 30
Jahre Charta von Paris – Die Organi-
sation für Sicherheit und Zusammenar-
beit in Europa für künftige Aufgaben
stärken, Deutscher Bundestag Druck-
sache 19/19140, 2020, https://dip21.bun
destag.de/dip21/btd/19/135/1913551.pdf
13 This is particularly important in light of
the June 2021 EU Council Decision not
to resume EU–Russia summits, contrary
to a joint French and German proposal
to do so in order to put EU–Russia rela-
tions on a similar footing to US–Russia
relations after the Putin–Biden meeting
in Geneva on 17 June 2021. While the
opportunities that the OSCE offers as a
forum cannot replace direct EU–Russia
dialogue, EU–Russia bilateral relations
should not prejudice relations with Rus-
sia within the multilateral context of the
OSCE, which provides one of the few
remaining opportunities for institution-
Towards a More Strategic Partnership
9
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748911456, am 10.10.2021, 01:02:51
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
alized dialogue that involves Russia, the
EU, and all of its member states.
14 See OSCE, Istanbul Document 1999
(Charter for European Security and Istan-
bul Summit Declaration), PCOEW389,
1999, 43-45, https://www.osce.org/mc/39
569
15 Council of the European Union, Draft
Council Conclusions on EU–OSCE Co-
operation in Conflict Prevention, Crisis
Management and Post-Conflict Rehabili-




16 Ibid., p. 2.
17 OSCE, Rules of Procedure of the Orga-
nization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe, MC.DOC/1/06, 1 November
2006, pp. 8, 10, https://www.osce.org/file
s/f/documents/5/0/22775.pdf
18 “First EU–OSCE high-level meeting takes
place in Brussels”, European External Ac-




en. See also: “Strengthening OSCE–EU
Co-operation Discussed at First Annual
High-Level Meeting Held in Brussels”,
OSCE, 13 December 2018, https://www
.osce.org/secretary-general/406682
19 See “Organisation for Security & Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE)”, Delega-
tion of the European Union to the Inter-




20 See “Working Party on the OSCE and
the Council of Europe”, European Coun-




21 Michael F. Harsch, The Power of Depen-
dence: NATO–UN Cooperation in Crisis
Management, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2015.
22 “The EU provides further satellite im-
agery support to the OSCE Special Moni-
toring Mission in Ukraine”, European
Commission, 24 March 2017, https://ec.
europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail
/es/IP_17_729
23 Rafael Biermann/Joachim A. Koops,
“Studying Relations Among Internation-
al Organizations in World Politics:
Core Concepts and Challenges”, in:
Rafael Biermann/Joachim A. Koops
(eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Inter-
Organization Relations, London: Pal-
grave MacMillan, 2017, 1-46, p. 22.
24 This excludes the operating costs of the
OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to
Ukraine.
25 A further complication for EU–OSCE co-
operation, with particular relevance to
the first dimension, arises from the fact
that twenty-six of the EU’s member states
are also members of NATO, whose thirty
members are all members of the OSCE.
26 Philip Remler, “The OSCE as Sisyphus:
Mediation, Peace Operations, Human
rights”, IAI Papers 21/16, Istituto Affari
Internazionali, April 2021, https://www.i
ai.it/sites/default/files/iaip2116.pdf
27 Barbara Gray, “Intervening to Improve
Inter-organizational Relationships”, in:
Steve Cropper/Mark Ebers/Chris Hux-
ham/Peter Smith Ring (eds.), The Oxford
Handbook of Inter-organizational Rela-
tions, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2008, 664-690.
28 See Dijkstra et al., cited above (Note 10)
and Galbreath, cited above (Note 10).
29 C.f. Stefan Wolff, “China: A Challenge
or an Opportunity for the OSCE?”, Se-




30 Established in 2014, this programme
has trained around 1,000 monitors to
David Galbreath, André Härtel and Stefan Wolff
10
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748911456, am 10.10.2021, 01:02:51
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
date and has been extended to contin-
ue until 2022. See “OSCE Secretary
General, high-level OSCE officials mark
fifth anniversary of AUTINT-run pre-
deployment training for Special Moni-
toring Mission to Ukraine in Götzendorf,
Lower Austria”, OSCE, 12 June 2019,
https://www.osce.org/secretary-general/
422819
Towards a More Strategic Partnership
11
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748911456, am 10.10.2021, 01:02:51
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
